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"DUE-ON" CLAUSES: A TREND TOWARD
EQUITABLE ENFORCEMENT
James D. Hill*
Contemporary lenders presently utilize at least two types of
clauses in a security instrument (mortgage or deed of trust) to generate additional income. Due-on-sale clauses accelerate the balance
of the obligation upon the sale or transfer of the subject property,'
and due-on-encumbrance clauses accelerate the balance of the obligation upon the placing of an additional burden or encumbrance on
the property. Such acceleration allows adjustment of interest to
current rates whenever encumbered property is sold. In a second
type of clause, prepayment penalty, lenders charge a penalty for
early payment of a loan prior to its maturity date. Because of these
kinds of limitations on the mortgagor, it can be said that these
provisions are restraints on alienation, although permissible ones in
most jurisdictions.
California courts and other courts across the country have had
difficulty balancing the need for acceleration clauses in an inflationary economy with the traditional prohibition against restraints on
alienation. This article analyzes the cases which have dealt with
acceleration clauses and the solutions which have been formulated.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Restraints on alienation of land were imposed at common law
by feudal lords with appropriate sanctions such as forfeiture or fine
imposed for violation. 2 While land was held tenurially and feudal
incidents were due the lords, harsh penalties were needed to preserve the land in the hands of those familiar to the lords and, even
more important, to prevent lands upon which the lords were dependent from falling into the hands of strangers or enemies. Certain
transfers were absolutely prohibited, while other alienations of the
3
fee were permitted, but only after payment of a fine to the lord.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Dayton. B.A., University of Nevada, 1957;
J.D., University of Denver, 1964.

1.

Berhardt, The Obligation in J.

HETLAND, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE SECURED
182 (1970) suggests the following model due-on-sale clause:
In the event the herein described property or any part thereof, or any interest
therein, is sold, agreed to be sold, conveyed or alienated by the trustor, or by the
operation of law or otherwise, all obligations secured by this instrument, irrespective
of the maturity dates expressed therein, at the option of the holder thereof, and without
demand or notice shall immediately become due and payable.

TRANSACTIONS

2. A.
3. C.

CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 227 (2d
MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 21
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A present day restraint on the transfer of encumbered land,
imposed by a lender, is not unlike the restraint imposed by feudal
lords who retained an interest in the land which for practical purposes served as security for the satisfaction of an obligation, although not a debt in the modern sense of the word. The oath of
fealty has been replaced today by the financial statement and credit
application; however, the desire to maintain the stability of the
lord's relationship to the one obligated remains unchanged. Just as
the lords were concerned about the performance of feudal incidents,
so are modern lenders concerned that the payment of the debt be
made promptly and that waste not be allowed to occur on the encumbered land.
In feudal times restraints on alienation, however, became repugnant to the concept of fee simple. In 1290 the Statute Quia
Emptores was enacted bringing about a drastic change in the law
regarding transfer of land. This statute allowed "freemen" to transfer land without payment of a fine to their lords and was the first
step in disallowing restraints on alienation. While it has been urged
that repugnancy alone is not sufficient to forbid restraints,4 the rule
against restraints on alienation continues to exist today. Exceptions
to the rule prohibiting restraints have so eroded the rule, however,
that the precise status of restraints in particular circumstances may
be impossible to determine. Justification for a restraint may occur,
according to the Restatement of Property, due either to its social
utility or because it is insignificant.'
Because they may be considered restraints on alienation, acceleration clauses' have not been used frequently until relatively recent
times. An 1823 Louisiana case provides the earliest mention of a
sanction imposed upon mortgagors in the United States.7 It involved
a doctrine known as the pact de non alienando.While there has been
4. Manning, The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray, 48 HARv. L. REV.
373, 402 (1935).
5. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 410, comment a (1944) provides:
Restraints on the alienation of property interests are justified if the objectives behind
the imposition of the restraint are sufficiently important to outweigh the social evils
which flow from the enforcement of the restraint or if the interference with the power
of alienation is so insignificant that no appreciable harm results from the enforcement
of the restraint.
6. Today, a typical acceleration clause will include both due-on-sale and due-onencumbrance provisions: "Should Trustor sell, convey, transfer, dispose of or further encumber said property or any part thereof,. . . without the written consent of Beneficiary being
first obtained, then Beneficiary shall have the right, at its option, to declare all sums secured
hereby forthwide due and payable." LaSala v. Am. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 869,
489 P.2d 1113, 1115, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 851 (1971).
7. Nathan v. Lee, 2 Mart (N.S.) 32 (La. 1823).
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some commentary on this doctrine,8 it does not appear to have been
used outside Louisiana.'
II.

PREPAYMENT PENALTIES

One kind of restraint clause used today by institutional lenders
is the prepayment penalty. It is analogous to the common law fine
levied in order to obtain the consent of the feudal lord to convey the
property. Institutional lenders are limited in the amount of prepayment penalty they can charge: the typical penalty is six months'
unearned interest on prepayments in excess of twenty percent of the
original principal balance paid in any calendar year. 0
Prepayment cases are rare. To the extent that it has considered
the issue, the California Courts of Appeals have approved the prepayment penalty as a permissible restraint on alienation. In one
case, Lazzareschi Investment Company v. San Francisco Federal
Savings and Loan Association," the court compared the prepayment penalty to the due-on-sale clause:
[It has been held that reasonable restraints made in protection of
justifiable interest of the parties are sustainable. (Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal.2d 311, 316-317 . . .) The Coast Bank case involved
a due-on-sale provision, but it was pointed out in the opinion that
several other kinds of restraints on alienation are recognized as lawful. The prepayment charge by no means constitutes an absolute
restraint and because we do not regard it as an exorbitant burden,
• . . and because there are legitimate interests of the lender to be
protected, . . . we do not discern any unlawful restraint on alienation."
It is obvious that a lender's right to refuse to approve a transfer
of property or to accelerate payment on sale of property or to collect
a prepayment penalty is a power which may be abused. One state
has taken steps to avoid potential abuse. The New York legislature
in 1972 enacted a statute which prohibits a lender from collecting a
prepayment penalty when it refused to consent to the transfer of
8. Comment, The Pact de Non Alienando in Louisiana, 21 TuL. L. REV. 238 (1946).
9. The pact de non alienando, when included in a mortgage allowed a mortgagee to
proceed against a mortgagor without notice to subsequent purchasers who did not assume the
mortgage. Pact de non alienando differs from the typical due-on-sale clause in that it is used
against defaulting mortgagors to protect the lender's security. It is not a direct result of
merely a sale of the encumbered property. The use of pact de non alienando became common
as a means of avoiding the technicalities of Louisiana's complicated hypothecary actions. Its
use is comparable to non-judicial foreclosure in common law jurisdictions.
10. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-12(b) (1976).
11. 22 Cal. App. 3d 303 (1971).
12. Id. at 311.

Published by eCommons, 1977

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:2

property encumbered with a mortgage containing a due-on-sale
clause.' 3 The constitutionality of this statute was upheld in Rogers
v. Williamsburgh Savings Bank. 4 The court found justification for
the statute in the soaring cost of housing and high mortgage interest
rates.
Not all courts have been as sympathetic as the Rogers court
toward the small borrower. Typically, courts have based their decisions on the lender's justifiable interests.'5 The Colorado Supreme
Court, quoting the affidavit of a savings and loan institution vicepresident, has presented most concisely the fundamental basis for
the existence of due-on-sale clauses, other than for the protection
of the lender's security:
The two primary ways that [an institutional lender] may make
the interest rate adjustments essential for it to protect the depositors
against inflation are by making variable interest rate loans or by
employing a "due-on-sale" clause to adjust interest rates on assumptions of existing loans where circumstances warrant an adjustment. . . . The variable interest rate option may reflect the trend in
the industry, but the due-on-sale provision is probably the most advantageous to the borrowing public."
While this author would disagree that due-on-sale clauses are advantageous to the borrowing public, it is apparent that they are used
to the lender's advantage to adjust interest rates in an inflationary
economy.

III.

THE

Coast Bank

DECISION

The earliest appellate decision to consider a clause permitting
acceleration upon transfer of the subject property occurred in California in 1964. That case, Coast Bank v. Minderhout,'1 became the
leading case in the United States and continues so today. While
Coast Bank has been followed in several jurisdictions'" as authority
for the proposition that a lender could accelerate the due date of an
obligation, the case did not arise out of a conventional mortgage or
13.
14.
15.

N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 254-a (McKinney Supp. 1976-77).
79 Misc. 2d 852, 361 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Dist. Ct. 1974).
See, e.g., Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr.

505 (1964).
16. Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 302, 509 P.2d 1240,
1244 (1973).
17. 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964).
18. Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294,509 P.2d 1240 (1973);
Baker v. Loves Park Say. and Loan Ass'n, 21111. App. 3d 42, 314 N.E.2d 306 (1974), modified,
61111. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 (1975); People's Say. Ass'n v. Standard Industries, Inc., 22 Ohio
App. 2d 35, 257 N.E.2d 406 (1970).
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deed of trust utilizing a due-on-sale clause. Rather, Coast Bank
involved an equitable mortgage on certain real property created by
the recordation of a document entitled "An Agreement Not to Encumber or Transfer Property." Similar documents had been held
not to create security interests in several other jurisdictions at that
time.' 9 The type of instrument in Coast Bank was commonly used
in California where certain lenders are prohibited from lending
funds which would create a junior lien.10 By utilizing "An Agreement Not to Encumber or Transfer Property" rather than a conventional deed of trust, California lenders are able to place loans which
could be construed as either a secured interest or an unsecured
interest so as not to violate the prohibition against a junior security.
The advantage to the lender in such a situation is obvious. In the
event of a foreclosure by the senior lienor on the property in question
or in the event the subject property appears overencumbered, the
lender holding the "Agreement Not to Encumber or Transfer Property" may treat the debt as unsecured; and in the event of a bankruptcy by the mortgagor, the junior lender may treat the debt as
secured, although in a junior position." The supreme court in Coast
Bank found that the provisions of the instrument afforded some
indication that the parties intended to create a security interest in
22
the property and allowed foreclosure of the equitable mortgage.
While Coast Bank did not present a clear-cut case involving a dueon-sale clause,2 3 it did allow the court to consider the issue of
whether such an instrument created an unlawful restraint on alienation. The court mentioned several justifiable and reasonable restraints on alienation which have been permitted: spendthrift
trusts, leases for a term of years terminable upon alienation, life
estates terminable upon alienation, corporate restrictions on transfers of shares, and restraints on alienation in executory land contracts.2 4 The court held:
In the present case it was not unreasonable for plaintiff [Coast
19. B. Kuppenheimer & Co. v. Mornin, 78 F.2d 261 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S.
615 (1935); Fisher v. Safe Harbor Realty Co., 38 Del. Ch. 297, 150 A.2d 617 (1959); Western
States Finance Co. v. Ruff, 108 Ore. 442, 215 P. 501 (1923); Knott v. Shepherdstown Mfg.
Co., 30 W. Va. 790, 5 S.E. 266 (1888).
20. CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West).
21. The ambiguous status of the instrument in Coast Bank was not entirely clarified
due to the fact that the defendants' demurrer was overruled and judgment entered subsequent to defendants' failure to answer.
22. 61 Cal. 2d at 315, 392 P.2d at 267, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
23. The case was not clear-cut because it involved an equitable mortgage rather than a
standard mortgage or deed of trust.
24. 61 Cal. 2d at 316-17, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
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Bank] to condition its continued extention of credit to the Enrights
on their interest in the property that stood as security for the debt.
Accordingly, plaintiff validly provided that it might accelerate the
due date if the Engrights encumbered or transfered the property.2

The language of Justice Traynor, who wrote the decision, is significant. He did not determine that due-on-sale clauses were reasonable; instead, he held simply that requiring the borrower's retention of an interest in the subject property was "not unreasonable."
Subsequent decisions interpreting Coast Bank, however, have
assumed that the case provided blanket approval for the use of
due-on-sale clauses."

IV.

CALIFORNIA CASES FOLLOWING

Coast Bank

Following Coast Bank, the California Courts of Appeals considered three cases involving due-on-sale or due-on-encumbrance
clauses.1 In all three decisions, the courts, relying on Coast Bank,
simply assumed (incorrectly in light of more recent decisions) the
universal validity of these clauses in California."
9
In 1971 in LaSala v. American Savings and Loan Association,"
the California Supreme Court reviewed a decision in which a clause
provided for acceleration upon either sale or further encumbrance.
25. Id. at 317, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508 (emphasis added).
26. See cases cited note 18 supra. Other authors feel that Justice Traynor was announcing a rule giving blanket approval to due-on-sale clauses. See Volkmer, The Application of
the Restraints on Alienation Doctrine to Real Property Security Interests, 58 IowA L. REV.
747, 774 (1973). See also Hetland, Real Propertyand Real Property Security: The Well Being
of the Law, 53 CALuF. L. REv. 151, 171 (1965).
27. Hellbaum v. Lytton Say. and Loan Ass'n, 274 Cal. App. 2d 456, 79 Cal. Rptr. 9
(1969); Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969),
overruled sub nom. Tucker v. Lassen Say. and Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 640, 526 P.2d 1169,
1176, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633, 640 (1974); and Jones v. Sacramento Say. Ass'n, 248 Cal. App. 2d
522 (1967).
28. In Hellbaum v. Lytton Say. and Loan Ass'n, 274 Cal. App. 2d 456, 458, 79 Cal. Rptr.
9, 11 (1969), the court held:
It is settled that an agreement not to encumber or transfer property, exacted by a
lender to protect his security interest, is not an invalid restraint on alienation. That is
so because the restraint is reasonably designed to protect the creditor's justifiable
interest in maintaining the direct responsibility of the parties on whose credit the loan
was made. (Coast Bank v. Minderhout).
274 Cal. App. 2d at 458, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
In Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969),
the plaintiff paid an assumption fee and was subjected to higher interest. The court held that
the sale to plaintiff enabled the savings and loan association to charge the assumption fee
and the higher rate of interest as consideration for its forebearance in not enforcing the dueon-sale clause. However, Cherry was overruled by Tucker v. Lassen Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 12
Cal. 3d 629, 640, 526 P.2d 1169, 1176, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633, 640 (1974).
29. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
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A further encumbrance was placed on the subject property by the
mortgagor, and defendant American Savings and Loan Association
invoked the acceleration clause. A class action challenging the validity of the due-on-encumbrance clause was commenced. American
offered to waive the right to accelerate, and the trial court dismissed
the action.
The California Supreme Court applied a rule of reasonableness
on the due-on-encumbrance clause and refused to allow the lender
to exercise an uncontrolled power with respect to the clause.
In those few instances previously discussed, in which the enforcement of that provision the due-on-encumbrace clause is reasonably
necessary to avert danger to the lender's security, the restraint on
alienation remains lawful under the principles established in Coast
Bank v. Minderhout (1964) 61 Cal.2d 311, 317. .

.

.When such en-

forcement is not reasonably necessary to protect the security, the
lender's use of the clause to exact collateral benefits must be held an
unlawful restraint on alienation3
The court continued, distinguishing between due-on-sale and dueon-encumbrance clauses:
Following our ruling upholding reasonable restraints on alienation, we have distinguished the due-on-sale from the due-onencumbrace clauses; we have concluded that the lender may insist
upon the automatic performance of the due-on-sale clause because
such a provision is necessary to the lender's security. We have decided, however, that the power lodged in the lender by the due-onencumbrance clause can claim no such mechanical justification. We
sustain it only in the case of the trial court's finding that it is reasonably necessary to the protection of the lender's security; to repose an
absolute power in the creditor to enforce the clause under any and
all circumstances could lead to an abusive application of it and in
some cases an arbitrary exaction of a quid pro quo from debtors. 31
The above quotations illustrate this author's contention that the
courts, including the California Supreme Court, assumed a virtually
universal validity of the due-on-sale clause. The supreme court
applied a rule of reasonableness to the enforcement of due-onencumbrance clauses where the lender's security is jeopardized.
Justice Traynor, the author of the Coast Bank decision, was no
longer sitting on the California Supreme Court when the LaSala
opinion was handed down. It would appear that the California Supreme Court, as the lower courts had done before it, had in LaSala
30. Id. at 882, 489 P.2d at 1124-25, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61.
31. Id. at 883-84, 489 P.2d at 1126, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 862.

Published by eCommons, 1977

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:2

extended the scope of Coast Bank and had given the rule promulgated in Traynor's opinion a broader interpretation than Traynor
would have intended.
V.

Coast Bank

IN THE DECISIONS OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS

In the decade following Coast Bank, several other jurisdictions
encountered the classic mortgage due-on-sale clause. Those courts
which relied on Coast Bank misinterpreted its scope as the California courts had done-citing it for the general, but erroneous, proposition that due-on-sale clauses are universally valid.
People's Savings Association v. Standard Industries, Inc.3 2 involved a mortgage containing a clause accelerating the entire principal, at the option of the lender, upon "any change in ownership of
the premises covered by this mortgage. ' 33 The validity of this clause
was challenged in a judicial foreclosure proceeding. The court held
that "a significant element in the mortgage contract is the mortgagor himself, his financial responsibility and his personal attitudes. 3 In so holding, the court relied on a section from Ohio
JurisprudenceSecond which dealt with acceleration upon default
but not specifically with due-on*sale clauses. In support of its holding, the court also cited the case of Nixon v. Buckeye Building and
Loan Company, 3 which likewise did not deal with due-on-sale acceleration clauses. The Ohio court further cited Coast Bank, stating: "Justice Traynor, in a thorough opinion, held that a similar
provision is a reasonable restraint designed to protect justifiable
interests of the parties." 37 The interpretation by the Ohio Court of
Appeals failed to distinguish between the reasonableness of due-onsale clauses in general and the reasonableness of Coast Bank's position in particular.
The Colorado Supreme Court in Malouff v. Midland Federal
Savings and Loan Association3 relied on both Coast Bank and
People's Savings Association. The court stated the law concisely
and accurately in its holding: "We subscribe to the view that the
question of the invalidity of the restraint depends upon its reasonableness in view of the justifiable interests of. the parties. '3 The
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

22 Ohio App. 2d 35, 257 N.E.2d 406 (1970).
Id. at 36, 257 N.E.2d at 406.
Id. at 38, 257 N.E.2d at 407-08.
37 Osuo JuR. 2d Mortgages § 80 (1959).
18 Ohio L. Abs. 261 (App. 1934).
22 Ohio App. 2d at 38, 257 N.E.2d at 407.
181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973).
Id. at 300, 509 P.2d at 1243.
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Colorado court, however, misinterpreted the import of Coast Bank
when it stated: "Coast Bank, . . . considered a landmark decision
in the area of due-on-sale clauses, upheld generally the validity of
such a clause and in effect rejected the view that such a clause in a
security instrument is per se an invalid restraint."' 0
The effect of the above cases was carried further in Baker v.
Loves Park Savings and Loan Association." The case was one of first
impression in Illinois and the intermediate appellate court said:
"Other jurisdictions, under varying rationale, have held that it was
reasonble for a lender to condition a continued extension of credit
upon the basis that the borrower retain his interest in property
securing the debt,"'" citing Malouff and People's Savings Association. The Illinois Supreme Court, in affirming the decision of the
intermediate appellate court, rejected any rule of reasonableness
and said: "[T]he valid and accepted purpose sought to be achieved
by the restraint in this mortgage, that is, the protection of the
lender's security interest, must determine the validity of the restraint and not the circumstances of each particular case. See Coast
43
Bank v. Minderhout.'
While Colorado, Illinois, and Ohio were relying upon Coast
Bank, New Jersey," Utah,' and Tennessee" cases involving due-onsale clauses were decided without reference to Coast Bank.
In Shalit v. Investors Savings and Loan Association,'7 the plaintiff had paid a fee in excess of $14,000 in return for a waiver by the
savings and loan association of its rights to accelerate payment upon
the change of ownership of the mortgaged property. Plaintiff sued
for return of the fee. The court used duress and usury as the basis
of its decision, and it made no mention of restraints on alienation.
The court concluded that the savings and loan association had a
right to receive payment of money in exchange for waiving its acceleration of the obligation. Reasonableness was not considered, but
the court stated that the right to payment in exchange for waiver
was "at least incidental and necessary to the business of the savings
4
and loan association and the attainment of its purpose as such.'
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
61 Il. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 (1975).
21111. App. 3d 42, 45, 314 N.E.2d 306, 309 (1974).
61 Ill. 2d at 126, 333 N.E.2d at 5.
Shalit v. Investors Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 101 N.J. Super. 283, 244 A.2d 151 (1968).
Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Neilson, 26 Utah 2d 383, 490 P.2d 328 (1971).
Gunther v. White, 489 S.W. 2d 529 (Tenn. 1973).
101 N.J. Super. 283, 244 A.2d 151 (1968).
Id. at 000, 244 A.2d at 151.
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A Tennessee case, Gunther v. White, 9 sought to restrain a
lender from enforcing an acceleration clause triggerd by the conveyance of the subject property. The court considered the validity of
such a clause in light of the lender's admitted motive for accelerating-a desire to increase the rate of interest on the funds loaned.
The court's holding may be interpreted to validate any due-on-sale
clause unless the clause was unconscionable:
It is generally accepted that a court of equity has the power to
relieve a mortgagor from the effect of an operative acceleration clause
in a mortgage where the condition of making the option operative is
the result of some unconscionable or inequitable conduct of the
mortgagee ...
No case has been found, however, which holds that the exercise
of the option to gain the benefit of the current interest rate falls into
these categories. And, upon reflection, we can think of no reason why
such exercise should be characterized as either unconscionable or
inequitable.N
The Gunther case makes no mention of Coast Bank but cites
People's Savings Association and cases subsequent to Coast Bank.5
Walker Bank & Trust Company v. Neilson52 is the first case in
which foreclosure was not permitted, although the acceleration
clause at issue was not held void. The case, however, offers little
clarification as to the status of due-on-sale clauses in Utah. The
Supreme Court of Utah refused to reverse the trial court's holding
that an acceleration clause was void as against public policy; the
trial court's conclusion was held to be harmless error. The foreclosure was disallowed, however, since the delinquent payments had
been tendered through the clerk of courts.
Some jurisdictions have treated due-on-sale clauses differently
than California and those states which interpreted Coast Bank as
blanket authority for the validity of such clauses. Wisconsin, 53 Ari49. 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973).
50. Id. at 531 (emphasis in original).
51. Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969),
overruled sub nom. Tucker v. Lassen Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 527 P.2d 1169,
116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974); LaSala v. Am. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97
Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
52. 26 Utah 383, 490 P.2d 328 (1971).
53. Mutual Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 58 Wis. 2d 112, 205
N.W.2d 762 (1973). The Wisconsin court held:
We find nothing unreasonable in respect to the clause that accelerates the payment of the entire balance upon a conveyance without the consent of the mortgagee.
Whether, under the circumstances, the invocation of the condition is in accord with
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zona, 5' and Florida55 backed away from a strict enforcement of dueon-sale clauses.
Beginning in 1970 a line of cases developed in Florida which
took a more subjective look at the facts of each case in determining
whether to allow foreclosure based solely on unauthorized transfer.
Clark v. Lachenmeier5' presented an almost perfect set of circumstances for a court to utilize its equitable power to refuse to allow
foreclosure. The due-on-sale clause in Lachenmeier was not a typical one in that it did not automatically accelerate upon transfer of
the subject property; rather it required that the mortgagee receive
notice of any transfer and reserved the right to approve or disapprove the credit standing of the proposed transferee. A foreclosure
action was brought following a transfer made without notice to the
mortgagee and without the required approval. There was no allegation that the mortgagee's security had been impaired by the transfer. The lower court dismissed the complaint, and the Florida Court
of Appeals affirmed, stating:
The Florida decisions recognize the right of a mortgagee to accelerate upon default of conditions directed to the preservation of the
security, such as the payment of interest, installments of principal,
taxes and insurance "because an investor may very properly insist
that his security shall be kept intact or that the loan shall mature."
A Court of equity may refuse to foreclose a mortgage when an
acceleration of the due date would render the acceleration unconscionable and the result would be inequitable and unjust.57
The Florida court recognized that acceleration upon breach of a
condition of the mortgage was permissible but was not universally
mandatory.
Subsequently, the Florida Court of Appeals considered a more
equitable principles must abide further factual determinations and decision by the
trial judge.
58 Wis. 2d at 112, 205 N.W.2d 762 at 770.
54. Baltimore Life Ins. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971), petitionfor review
denied, 108 Ariz. 192, 494 P.2d 1322 (1972). Although the court allowed acceleration clauses
as part of a mortgage transaction, it refused to enforce them across the board: "it is not
enough to allege merely that the acceleration clause has been violated. Absent an allegation
that the purpose of the clause is in some respect being circumvented or that the mortgagee's
security is jeopardized, a plaintiff cannot be entitled to equitable relief." 15 Ariz. App. at
00, 486 P.2d at 193.
55. Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. App. 1970); Stockman v. Burke, 305 So.
2d 89 (Fla. App. 1974).
56. 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. App. 1970).
57. Id. at 584.
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typical due-on-sale clause. In Stockman v. Burke58 the court allowed
the foreclosure, indicating that there was no basis upon which to
nullify the provision for payment upon resale of the property. However, the court, citing Clark v. Lachenmeier, left undecided the
question of strict enforcement of a due-on-sale clause: "We leave
open until another day the question of whether a mortgage with a
similar provision can be accelerated and foreclosed upon the sale of
the property without a showing that the mortgagee has been prejudiced by reason of the conveyance to the new owner."5 9 Although the
result in Stockman is consistent with Clark v. Lachenmeier, there
is no mention in Stockman of any breach other than a sale of the
subject property, nor is there any allegation that the mortgagee was
in any way prejudiced by the transfer. From the court's comment
quoted above, however, it is possible to assume that there must have
been some evidence of prejudice to the mortgagee as a result of the
transfer. What is prejudicial to the mortgagee or jeopardized the
security is a subjective matter of fact to be determined by the trial
court.
Reading these two Florida decisions together, it appears that
Florida has reached a solution to the problem of enforcing due-onsale clauses; that is, each transaction will be viewed on a case-bycase basis giving consideration to whether enforcement will produce
an inequitable or unjust result.
VI.

The Tucker DECISION

In its decision in Tucker v. Lassen Savings and Loan Associathe California Supreme Court appeared to be reaching the
same practical solution with respect to due-on-sale clauses that
the Florida courts had reached several years earlier. The Tucker
decision shows a willingness to consider the enforcement of dueon-sale clauses on a case-by-case basis rather than giving such
clauses the blanket approval that Coast Bank was thought to provide. This author believes that Tucker was not a departure from
Justice Traynor's logic in Coast Bank but rather was a proper application of the rule that, in the narrow circumstances of Coast Bank,
the lender was justified in imposing a restraint on alienation by
means of a type of due-on-sale instrument.
The importance of Tucker is twofold: first, it indicates that
subjective criteria would be used to determine whether to allow
tion,60

58.
59.
60.

305 So. 2d 89 (Fla. App. 1974).
Id. at 90.
12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
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enforcement of due-on-sale clauses; secondly, it advances the possibility that the decision in the case might be applied in cases with
different facts.
Tucker did not involve the usual conveyance by deed; rather,
it concerned an installment contract. The contract, until paid in full
left title but not possession in the vendor. The deed of trust provided
for acceleration if the borrower should "'sell, convey or alienate the
property. . or any part thereof, or any interest therein."'' There
should be no question that the execution of a land installment contract which provides for transfer of possession and ultimately, transfer of record title, is in fact the conveyance of an interest in the
subject property. The court considered the factual differences between a transfer by deed and conveyance of equitable interest by an
installment land contract, and concluded that the vendor-obligor
had a considerable interest in maintaining the property until the
total proceeds under the contract were received. 2 The court did not
permit the automatic enforcement of the due-on-sale clause when
the only basis for acceleration was the conveyance of an equitable
interest by the installment land contract. Although one author has
argued persuasively that the court's reasoning was fallacious because the vendor's interest in the subject property diminished as the
balance due the vendor decreased, 3 the California court's logic was
that the vendor in a land installment contract would continue to
have concern for the maintenance of the property until the entire
purchase price was paid.6 Even though the vendor's interest would
diminish as payments were made, the lender still must look to the
subject property, regardless of the proportion of the balance due. In
this respect the vendor under an installment land contract is no
different from the typical mortgagee.
The court in Tucker, in considering the difference between
what it called an outright sale and an installment sale, 5 commented
that the vendor in the former transaction usually sells for cash and
has the funds available to pay off the existing encumbrance. In the
typical installment sale, on the other hand, the vendor receives a
low down payment and retains legal title. Although the court observed the financial differences between these transactions, it overlooked a third possibility or middle position: an outright sale in
61.
62.
63.
Defense,
64.
65.

Id. at 632, 526 P.2d at 1170, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
Id. at 638, 526 P.2d at 1174-75, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
Ashley, Use of "Due-On" Clauses to Gain CollateralBenefits: A Common Sense
10 U. TULSA L.J. 590, 602 (1975).
12 Cal. 3d at 638, 526 P.2d at 1174-75, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638-39.
Id. at 637, 625 P.2d at 1174, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
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which the vendor carries back a second mortgage for a substantial
portion of the purchase price. In that case the vendor would receive
a low down payment and would continue to maintain an interest in
the subject property since it is to that security that he must look in
the event of default. How does this third alternative differ from an
installment contract? This author is of the opinion that it is a matter of form rather than of substance. By failing to consider this third
possibility, the court left the door open to new litigation concerning
the right of a lender to accelerate the balance upon sale if the
lender's security is not truly jeopardized by the transfer. Ifa vendormortgagor could show that the security was not impaired and that
the vendor continued to maintain an interest in the property, would
it be reasonable for a senior lienor to accelerate its balance based
solely upon the transfer? If the courts were to follow the logic of both
Coast Bank and Tucker, they could find such acceleration unreasonable and could therefore prevent foreclosure by a senior lienor.
The potential for resolution of any conflict between Coast Bank
and Tucker as to the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses now exists
since there are presently before the California Supreme Court two
cases whose holdings are contradictory on the point.66 In Demey v.
JouJon-Roche7 a sale of encumbered property was frustrated when
the mortgagees announced their intent to exercise the due-on-sale
clause. When the pending sale collapsed, the mortgagor stopped
making payments on the debt. Foreclosure followed causing the
mortgagor to lose the property. Suit was filed for the damages resulting from the loss of the sale of the property. Judgment was
entered for the plaintiff and affirmed by the court of appeals. The
proposed sale, which prompted the foreclosure and ultimate litigation, called for the vendees to take title subject to defendant's existing first deed of trust and further subject to a purchase money
second mortgage in favor of plaintiffs. This fact situation is the
"middle" position alluded to above 8 which the court in Tucker
failed to consider. The Demey transaction, although in form an
outright sale, was very similar to an installment contract (which was
the subject of Tucker). The decision in Demey appears to follow the
philosophy of Tucker, relying on the substance of the transaction
66. Demey v. JouJon-Roche, 63 Cal. App. 3d 178 (1976); Medovi v. Am. Say. and Loan
Ass'n, 62 Cal. App. 3d 317 (1976). Petition for hearing was granted by the California Supreme
Court as to both cases on January 5, 1977. The authority on which both cases relied was
Tucker v. Lassen Say. and Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633
(1974).
67. 63 Cal. App. 3d 178 (1976).
68. See discussion at p. 000 supra.
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rather than its form, for the court states: "In Tucker v. Lassen
Savings and Loan Association . . . the Supreme Court considered
the validity of such clauses in cases where, as here, the proposed
resale was by way of an installment land purchase with the original
buyer remaining liable on the original trust deed note."" The court
in Demey also points out that the land in question was unimproved
desert land not subject to waste and that vendor-mortgagors still
retained a substantial interest in the property involved.70
Notwithstanding the court's categorization of the sale in Demey
as an installment land purchase, it is not the typical installment
sale where title remains in the vendor until the purchase price is
entirely paid. However, the fact that the purchase price was not to
be paid in cash left the vendors in virtually the same position as if
the property was to be sold by way of an installment contract; the
vendors retained an interest in the land even though both title and
possession were to pass to the vendees. The court based its reliance
on Tucker in the fact that it found the substance of the transactions
to be similar although the form was different.
The decision in Medovi v. American Savings and Loan Association7 ' is much less compelling. There, the holder of a second
deed of trust had accepted a deed in lieu of foreclosure from a
mortgagor in default. Subsequently the property was transferred to
a new buyer. The holder of the senior lien, American Savings and
Loan Association, gave notice of exercise on the due-on-sale clause.
When the balance was not paid in full, foreclosure was commenced
with the savings and loan association collecting rents from the six
unit appartment house on the property under a rents and profits
clause. Ultimately the property was lost in foreclosure, and an action for wrongful foreclosure was commenced. In affirming the judgment for American Savings and Loan Association, the court of appeals relied on Tucker, noting the distinction in that decision between installment sales and outright sales. 72 The court in Medovi
appears to assume that enforcement of due-on-sale clauses is automatic in an outright sale but permitted in a land installment sale
only when there is a showing that the lender's security is in
jeopardy, and Tucker is cited for that proposition.73
The conflict between Demey and Medovi obviously arises from
differing interpretations of Tucker, Medovi basing its reliance on
69.

63 Cal. App. 3d at 182 (emphasis added).

70.

Id.

71.
72.
73.

62 Cal. App. 3d 317 (1976).
Id. at 331.
Id. at 330-31.
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form and Demey on substance. The California Supreme Court now
has the task of resolving the conflict between these two decisions.
VII.

CONCLUSION

If the Florida cases" and Tucker" signal a trend on the part of
the courts to look to subjective criteria in determining the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses, lenders will no longer be able to protect their security or increase the interest rates at every sale. Alternatives to due-on-sale clauses must therefore be considered. One
author has suggested that lenders increase interest rates but allow
the periodic payments to remain the same as under the lower rate
by extending the term of the loan." Another has proposed variable interest rates." If enforcement of due-on-sale becomes less
predictable, lenders may resort to shorter term loans with balloon
payments at the end of the term. This would allow the lender to
keep the payments at the same level as those of longer term financing but would assure readjustment of the interest rate at the end of
the short term. This could be considered simply a variation of variable interest rates.
It is apparent that enforcement of due-on-sale clauses is no
longer as simple as it once was immediately after Coast Bank. Strict
enforcement has been avoided by some states. California, where the
issue was first litigated, now appears likely to adopt strictly equitable, subjective criteria for enforcement.
The economic impact of case-by-case enforcement is almost
incalculable. Lenders whose assets are long term and whose liabilities are short term will be in an extremely difficult situation without
this readily available means of adjusting interest rates upward. Notwithstanding this fact, it appears that most courts will take a position which will not permit universal enforcement without regard to
the safety of the security. The current judicial and legislative trend
toward protecting the borrower instead of the lender may also cause
74. Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. App. 1970); Stockman v. Burke, 305 So.
2d 89 (Fla. App. 1974).
75. Tucker v. Lassen Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr.
633 (1974).
76. Philip Ashley, referring to Federal Home Loan Bank Board Regulation T-56, points
out that the maturity date of a loan could be extended while increasing the interest rate so
that the monthly payment would not increase. He further notes, however, the conflict between this proposition and the maximum term limit of thirty years. Ashley, Use of "DueOn" Clauses to Gain CollateralBenefits: A Common Sense Defense, 10 U. TULSA L.J. 590,
607 (1975).
77. Myers, Acceleration Clauses as a Protection for Mortgagees in a Tight Money
Market, 20 S.D. L. REv. 329 (1975).
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serious difficulty to the lending industry. Only innovative methods
of finance and congressional legislation will now protect the institutional lender.
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